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AWAY FROM JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS: THE FOREIGN
COUNTRY EXCEPTION TO THE FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of sovereign immunity developed from the English notion that
"the King can do no wrong."' By 1834, sovereign immunity had become a
fundamental principle of the American legal system.2 According to Justice
Holmes, the doctrine rests on "the logical and practical ground that there can be
no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends." 3 Legal scholars and commentators have, however, consistently criti-
cized sovereign immunity as unfair and unnecessary.4 This criticism, as well as
judicial antagonism towards the doctrine, led Congress to enact the Federal
Torts Claims Act (FTCA)5 in 1946.
The FTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the United States government
in actions involving torts committed by government officials and employees.
6
Generally, the FTCA provides that the United States may be held liable exactly
as a private person would be, "in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred.",7 The FTCA contains several exceptions to this gen-
eral rule s however, including the exclusion of "claims arising in a foreign coun-
try."9 This exception is known as the foreign country exception.
1. COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
ATrORNEYS GENERAL, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: THE TORT LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT
AND ITS OFICIALS 1 (1979) [hereinafter SOVEREIGN IMMUNrrY]. For a general discussion of
the historical development of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the United States see id. at
1-8.
2. See United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436 (1834).
3. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
4. See, ag., Borchard, Theories of Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 28 COLUM. L.
REV. 734 (1928); Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924); see
also W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 131, at 1032 (5th ed. 1984) in which
the authors state that "[t]he description of immunities today is largely the description of aban-
donment and limitations on the immunities erected in an earlier day."
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1982). See infra notes 23-34 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the legislative history of the FTCA.
6. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680.
7. Id. § 1346(b). Federal district courts have jurisdiction over FTCA claims. Id.
§ 1346(a). Throughout this Comment, all references to courts are to United States federal
courts.
8. See, eg., id. § 2680(a) (discretionary functions); id. § 2680(h) (assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresen-
tation, deceit, interference with contract rights); id. § 26800) (combatant activity of the
military).
9. Id. § 2680(k).
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Only one United States Supreme Court decision, United States v. Spelar,1
0
decided in 1949, has ever addressed the issue of the foreign country exception to
the FTCA. According to the Spelar Court, Congress enacted the foreign coun-
try exception to insulate the United States from claims that would subject the
United States to the laws of another nation." Lower courts have since strayed
from this purpose in cases concerning the exception.
12
Lower courts have employed two basic tests to determine whether to apply
the foreign country exception. The first concerns the definition of "foreign
country." 13 This prong of the test was the main focus of the earliest decisions
involving the foreign country exception. 14 Certain types of international loca-
tions were designated foreign countries,15 and these designations have rarely
been questioned. However, in determining whether a foreign country was in-
volved, the courts in these early cases failed to arrive at a concrete method for
deciding the meaning of the term "foreign." 16 The lack of any real standard is
evidenced by a recent case in which the court struggled to decide whether the
10. 338 U.S. 217 (1949).
11. Id. at 221.
12. See, e.g., Cominotto v. United States, 802 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1986); Eaglin v. United
States, 794 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1986); Leaf v. United States, 588 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1978);
Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964). For a
discussion of Cominotto, see infra text accompanying notes 113-18. For a discussion of Eaglin,
see infra text accompanying notes 108-112. For a discussion of Leaf, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 83-86. For a discussion of Meredith, see infra text accompanying notes 53-57.
13. The United States Supreme Court addressed the difficulty of defining foreign country
in Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1 (1932). Burnet involved interpretation of the
Revenue Code:
The word "country" in the expression "foreign country," is ambiguous. It may be
taken to mean foreign territory or a foreign government. In the sense of territory, it
may embrace all the territory subject to a foreign sovereign power. When referring
more particularly to a foreign government, it may describe a foreign state in the
international sense,... or it may mean a foreign government which has authority
over a particular area or subject matter.... The term "foreign country" is not a
technical or artificial one, and the sense in which it is used in a statute must be
determined by reference to the purpose of the particular legislation.
Id. at 5-6.
14. See, eg., Meredith, 330 F.2d at 11 (United States embassy buildings and grounds in
Bangkok, Thailand within foreign country exception); Burna v. United States, 240 F.2d 720,
721 (4th Cir. 1957) (Okinawa foreign country although United States had temporary sover-
eignty over it); Brunell v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 68, 71-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (Saipan foreign
country although in possession and under control of United States by military conquest);
Straneri v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 240, 241 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (Belgium foreign country even
though under military control of United States).
15. See Spelar, 338 U.S. at 219 (air bases in Newfoundland on land leased to United States
by Great Britain); Meredith, 330 F.2d at 11 (United States embassy in Bangkok, Thailand);
Brunell, 77 F. Supp. at 72 (land in which United States acted as trustee).
16. See, eg., Meredith, 330 F.2d at 10-11 (common sense reading of foreign country excep-
tion requires that embassies on foreign soil be considered foreign countries); Straneri, 77 F.
Supp. at 241 (foreign country anywhere that United States Congress is not "supreme legisla-
tive body"); Brunell, 77 F. Supp. at 72 (foreign country anything other than "component part
or a political subdivision" of the United States).
[VCol. 22:603
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foreign country exception should apply to Antarctica. 17
The second issue that a court confronts when analyzing the foreign country
exception is determining where the claim arises. The FTCA directs courts to
look at the place where the negligence occurred in order to determine where the
claim arose.1 8 However, it is not always clear what constitutes the negligence
that proximately caused the injury or where that negligence occurred. Some
courts recognize "headquarters claims," in which a claim is allowed, even if the
government employee acted in a foreign country, when a claimant can show that
that employee's actions were based on negligent guidance from an office in the
United States.19 Other courts refuse to recognize headquarters claims or any
kind of "continuing tort.",20 Determining where a claim arose has become the
focus of most of the recent cases involving the foreign country exception.2 1
This Comment addresses the problems currently plaguing courts in apply-
ing the foreign country exception. It also analyzes the policies behind the excep-
tion and examines whether the courts' decisions have furthered or hindered
those policies. Finally, this Comment proposes a clear standard for courts to
apply to reach decisions that are more equitable and more consistent with the
goals of the FTCA.
II. ADOPTION OF THE- FTCA
Congress enacted the FTCA as part of the Legislative Reorganization Act
17. Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The court in Beattie held that
Antarctica was not a foreign country within the meaning of the foreign country exception
because it was not and had never been subject to the law of any sovereign. Id. at 105-06.
The court's difficulty in reaching this decision is apparent from the fact that it was a two
to one decision, with lengthy, separate opinions from each judge.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). Under the FTCA:
[T]he general directive is that the government is to be held "in the same manner and
in the same extent as a private individual under the circumstances." The federal
courts are directed to follow... the tort law of the state in which the tort occurred,
including its choice of law rules.
W. KEETON, supra note 4, at 1034 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2674).
19. See, e.g., Eaglin, 794 F.2d at 984 (claim that army officials in United States failed to
warn plaintiff of "black ice" hazards in West Germany); Beattie, 756 F.2d at 105 (claim that
United States Navy air traffic controllers negligently caused airplane crash in Antarctica);
Leaf, 588 F.2d at 736 (claim that officials in United States negligently planned and operated
drug investigation in Mexico).
20. Occasionally a "continuing-tort" theory can be used to overcome the foreign country
exception when a tort that continues over an extended period of time causes injury both in a
foreign country and in the United States. But see, Grunch v. United States, 538 F. Supp. 534,
537 (E.D. Mich. 1982) ("Michigan law does not recognize a 'continuing negligence' cause of
action which suffices to override the 'foreign country' exception of the FTCA.").
21. See, e.g., Cominotto v. United States, 802 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1986); Eaglin v. United
States, 794 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1986); Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
Glickman v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Agent Orange Product
Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) [hereinafter Agent Orange]; In re
Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975). See infra notes 72-118
and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
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of 1946 (Reorganization Act).22 In passing the Reorganization Act, Congress
was directly responding to the growing number of private bills2 3 in which the
proponents sought appropriations of money in reparation of injuries caused by
government employees and officials.24 These bills were seriously impeding Con-
gress' regular legislative work.2 5 As part of the Reorganization Act, Congress
prohibited private bills for claims that had a remedy under the FTCA. 2 6 Con-
gress also had recognized that judicial support for the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity had eroded2 7 and that justice demanded that individuals be able to
recover for claims against the federal government, at least for some injuries.
28
22. 92 CONG. REc. 10048 (1946).
23. Prior to the passage of the FTCA, an individual could recover damages for torts com-
mitted by the United States or its employees only by presenting a private bill in Congress.
There was no judicial remedy for torts committed by the government. See Pound, The Tort
Claims Act: Reason or History?, 37 TUL. L. REv. 685, 689-90 (1963).
Alexander Holtzoff describes the system of bringing private bills to Congress as follows:
Because of a lack of a judicial remedy with respect to claims against the Govern-
ment, the custom of appealing to the legislature for relief originated in the very first
Congress. The first private bill passed by the Congress of the United States for the
purpose of adjusting an original claim became law on June 4, 1790.... As early as
1792, a private act of Congress recognizing a tort claim against the United States
became law....
Presumably for want of any other remedy, it became the customary practice to
handle claims against the Government by special legislation. Business of this type
gradually grew in volume to a point at which it became a serious burden on the
members of Congress.
Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort Claims Against the Federal Government, 9 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 311 (1942) (footnotes omitted).
24. 92 CONG. REc. 10048 (1946); see also Pound, supra note 23, at 689-90.
25. On January 14, 1942, urging passage of the FTCA, President Roosevelt sent a message
to Congress pointing out that over 6,300 private bills had been introduced in the last three
Congresses. Armstrong and Cockrill, The Federal Tort Claims Bill, 9 LAw & COMTEMP.
PROBS. 327 & n.6 (1942). The bills had cost over $144,000 per Congress, and less than 20% of
the bills introduced had become law. Id.
See H.R. REP. No. 2428, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 8 (1940) in which the United States Attor-
ney General discussed the "cumbersome" nature of private bills to Congress. See also Holtz-
off, supra note 23, at 312, which quotes John Quincy. Adams as saying that: "One half of the
time of Congress is consumed by [private business], and there is no common rule ofjustice for
any two of the cases decided. A deliberative assembly is the worst of all tribunals for the
administration ofjustice." Id. (citing 8 J.Q. ADAMS, MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINcY ADAMS 479-
80 (1876)).
26. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 154 & n.6 (1963) (citing Legislative Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1946, § 131, 60 Stat. 831, 2 U.S.C. § 190g); see also Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15, 24-25 (1953); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139-40 (1950).
27. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
28. During debate on the FTCA, the United States Attorney General stated that, "[t]he
continued immunity of the Government to suit on common law torts does not seem to be
warranted either as a matter of principle or as a matter of justice." H.R. REP. No. 2428, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. 8 (1940); see also Blachly and Oatman, Approaches to Governmental Liability
in Tort .4 Comparative Survey, 9 LAW & CONTEMp. PRoBs. 181 (1942) wherein the authors
stated the modern problems with sovereign immunity as follows:
The rapid growth of public services and functions in most countries, the large
numbers of persons engaged in the civil service or in the military forces, and the
[Vol. 22:603
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Congress included the following policies in the FTCA's statement of purpose:
(1) a desire on the part of the federal government in the interests of
justice and fair play to permit a private litigant to satisfy his legal
claims for injury or damage suffered at the hands of a United States
employee acting in the scope of his employment;
(2) the need of the Congress to be relieved of the burden imposed by
multitudinous bills for private relief arising from tort claims against
government employees;
(3) the advantage of an impartial judicial forum for both the com-
plainant and the Government in which to discover the facts in the
same manner as private law suits;
(4) a desire of Congress to expedite the payment of just claims.
29
Congress drafted the FTCA over a twenty-seven year period, beginning in
1919.30 The 1942 draft of the FTCA excepted claims "arising in a foreign coun-
try in behalf of an alien."'3 1 A revised version of the bill32 eliminated the last five
words of the earlier version, resulting in the foreign country exception as it exists
today-"arising in a foreign country.",3 3 Records of statements made at con-
gressional hearings on the FTCA clearly indicate that the overall goal of Con-
gress in enacting the foreign country exception was to prevent the United States
government from becoming subject to the laws of another nation.
34
increase in the number of risks brought about by mechanisms such as the automo-
bile, the airplane, and other methods of transportation, means that an ever-increasing
number of persons will suffer injuries resulting from governmental acts and opera-
tions. A problem of great importance, then, is that of the responsibility of the state and
its agents for such injuries.
Id. (emphasis added). Since 1942, technological advances have made it even more likely that
people will suffer injuries resulting from governmental acts or omissions. Thus, it has become
even more important that the government assume responsibility for the injuries caused by its
employees.
29. SOVEREIGN IMMUNrrY, supra note 1, at 43.
30. See United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 220 n.6 (1949), wherein the Court stated:
Agitation for reform of the cumbersome private bill procedure bore its first fruit in
H.R. 14727 introduced in the third session of the Sixty-fifth Congress in 1919. The
subject was almost continuously before one House or the other until the final passage
of the substance of the present Act by the Seventy-ninth Congress.
Id.
31. H.R. 5373, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., § 303(12) (1942).
32. H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., § 402(12) (1942).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1982).
34. In United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949), the United States Supreme Court
quoted dialogue that occurred at congressional hearings pertaining to the scope of the FTCA.
The pertinent discussion was as follows:
Mr. Shea. Claims arising in a foreign country have been exempted from this
bill, H.R. 6463, whether or not the claimant is an alien. Since liability is to be deter-
mined by the law of the situs of the wrongful act or omission it is wise to restrict the
bill to claims arising in this country. This seems desirable because the law of the
January 1989]
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III. APPLICATION OF THE FOREIGK CouNTRY EXCEPTION
A. An Attempt To Define Foreign Country
In early cases interpreting the foreign country exception to the FTCA,
courts broadly defined "foreign country" as it applies to the exception. 35 For
example, in Straneri v. United States,36 a district court held that a foreign coun-
try was anywhere that the United States Congress was not the "supreme legisla-
tive body."' 37 Thus, in Straneri, the claimant could not recover for injuries
sustained in Ghent, Belgium when a vehicle driven by a member of the United
States Army struck him, notwithstanding that Belgium was under military con-
trol of 'the United States at the time.
38
In Brunell v. United States,39 another district court even more broadly de-
fined "foreign country." The court held that recovery under the FTCA was
limited to claims arising in a "component part or political subdivision of the
United States." 4 In Brunell, the plaintiff alleged that she had been injured by a
negligently operated army jeep that ran off the road and into a tree in Saipan.
4 1
The court determined that the United States trusteeship of Saipan did not affect
Saipan's status as a foreign country.42 Thus, early courts developed the general
rule that, absent legislative intent to the contrary, a foreign country was any
particular State is being applied. Otherwise, it will lead I think to a good deal of
difficulty.
Mr. Robison. You mean by that any representative of the United States who
committed a tort in England or some other country could not be reached under this?
Mr. Shea. That is right. That would have to come to the Committee on Claims
in Congress.
Id. at 221 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1942)). See
infra notes 190-232 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether the courts have reached
decisions consistent with this policy.
35. See infra notes 36-57 for a discussion of these cases.
36. 77 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. Pa. 1948). In Straneri the plaintiff was a merchant seaman in
Ghent, Begium which was then under the military control of the United States following
World War II. Id. On May 29, 1945 the plaintiff was riding a motorcycle when a vehicle
operated by a member of the United States Army swerved into his lane. Id. Plaintiff suffered
severe head injuries and on April 25, 1946, plaintiff committed suicide as a result of the conse-
quences of those injuries. Id. at 241.
37. Id. The court went on to state that:
[A]s one of the conditions precedent to recovery from the United States, the tort
must have been committed on lands within the boundaries of the United States or its
territories or possessions. All other lands are to be considered as foreign country
[sic] irrespective of the degree of control the executive branch of the United States
government might otherwise exert over them.
Id.
38. Id.
39. 77 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
40. Id. at 72.
41. Id. at 69.
42. Id. at 72. "Although... Saipan was in the possession and under the control of the
United States by reason of military conquest and occupation, it cannot in any sense be deemed
to have been either a component part or a political subdivision of this nation." Id.
[Vol. 22:603
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place outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
4 3
In United States v. Spelar,4 the United States Supreme Court applied that
same general rule in its only interpretation of the foreign country exception to
the FICA. The Court was confronted with the issue of whether the foreign
country exception to the FTCA barred recovery for a death occurring on a New-
foundland air base leased to the United States from Great Britain for ninety-nine
years.45 The claimant alleged that negligent operation of Harmon Field, the air
base at which the crash occurred, caused her husband's death.4 6 She based her
cause of action on Newfoundland's wrongful death statute.47 The Court held
that the foreign country exception barred recovery because Great Britain was
sovereign over the air bases.48 Even though Great Britain had leased the base to
the United States, the Court determined that it "remained subject to the sover-
eignty of Great Britain and lay within a 'foreign country.' "49 Since the law to
be applied was the law of Newfoundland,5 0 the Court found that the case rested
squarely within the foreign country exception, which Congress enacted to pre-
vent the United States from becoming subject to another nation's laws.5 1 The
Court, therefore, denied the plaintiff any recovery under the FTCA.5 2
The-Ninth Circuit purportedly added "common sense" to the definition of
foreign country in Meredith v. United States.53 The allegedly negligent acts and
omissions in that case occurred within the grounds of the United States embassy
in Bangkok, Thailand.54 The court stated that while no one challenged the
power of Congress to extend United States liability to claims arising at a United
States embassy on foreign soil, a common sense reading of "foreign country"
under section 2680(k)5 5 led it to conclude that embassies on foreign soil are to be
treated as foreign countries.5 6 In so ruling, the court presumed that the law to
be applied would be that of Thailand, since "obviously our embassy at Bangkok
has no tort law of its own."
57
A very broad definition of foreign country, under which virtually any place
43. But cf Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1948) (applicability of labor law to
Government contractors working on military bases not under lease to the United States).
44. 338 U.S. 217 (1949).
45. Id. at 218-19.
46. Id. at 218.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 219.
49. Id.
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). Under the FTCA, the United States is liable as if it
were a private person, "in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred." Id.
51. Spelar, 338 U.S. at 219.
52. Id.
53. 330 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1964).
54. Id. at 10.
55. Id. at 11. Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory citations are to Title 28 of the
United States Code.
56. Id. at 10-11.
57. Id. at 10. But see Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (foreign
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not actually within the United States was deemed a foreign country, emerged in
these early cases.58 Beattie v. United States,59 a recent case concerning Antarc-
tica, has apparently shifted the focus from physical location to sovereignty.
60
Although courts in earlier cases had discussed sovereignty, 61 the practical effect
of those decisions was that in order to recover in tort against the United States,
"the tort must have been committed on lands within the boundaries of the
United States or its territories or possessions." 62 In Beattie, the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit held that since Antarctica was not subject to the sovereign power
of any nation, it was not a foreign country even though Antarctica was physi-
cally located outside of the United States, and was not a United States territory
or possession.
63
Before Beattie, the question of the definition of foreign country, separating
the United States from foreign countries based on physical location, seemed rela-
tively well settled.64 The court's decision in Beattie, however, makes it clear that
there are still gaps in that definition.6' Further, the fact that the court was
divided 2-1 in Beattie66 indicates that a more easily applicable standard is neces-
sary in order for courts and claimants to have a more definite understanding of
the bounds of the foreign country exception.
B. Shift Of Focus
Notwithstanding the need for a clearer definition of foreign country, the
majority of courts that have dealt with the foreign country exception in recent
years have focused their inquiry on the other half of the exception. Rather than
attempting to determine what a foreign country is, these courts have focused on
providing definition and substance to the "arising in" language of the foreign
country exception.
The foreign country exception to the FTCA excepts "claims arising in a
country exception not applicable to Antarctica since Antarctica has no sovereign or law of its
own).
58. While this may appear to be a fairly clear-cut area, and in most cases it is, there are
still some problems with the courts' approach. See infra notes 155-89 and accompanying text
for a discussion of whether the courts' decisions are consistent with the purposes and goals of
the FTCA.
59. 756 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
60. Id. at 94-95.
61. See Burna v. United States, 756 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1957) (temporary transfer of sover-
eignty over Okinawa does not change its status as foreign country); Brunell v. United States,
77 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (land conquered by United States, although under sovereignty
of United States, did not become part of United States, thus was still foreign country); Straneri
v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (lands outside boundaries of United States
are foreign countries regardless of amount of control exerted by United States over them).
62. Straneri, 77 F. Supp. at 241 (emphasis added).
63. Beattie, 756 F.2d at 105.
64. See cases cited supra note 61.
65. Beattie, 756 F.2d 91.
66. See supra discussion at note 17.
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foreign country" from coverage.67 In earlier cases, the courts generally operated
under an assumption that the negligence and the injury occurred in the same
place. 68 Courts, however, no longer make that assumption. More recent courts
have focused on the site of the negligence, as opposed to that of the injury, to
determine where the claim arose.69 Advances in technology and communication
have increased the possibility that an act or omission in the United States can
have repercussions somewhere else in the world. The courts in more recent
cases, therefore, have closely examined the site of the negligence in order to
determine whether the foreign country exception should apply.
Generally, a claim arises where the negligent act or omission occurs, 70 not
where that act or omission has its "operative effect.",71 For example, in In re
Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974,72 the plaintiffs sued the United States govern-
ment for injuries sustained in a plane crash in France.7 3 The court held that the
plaintiffs' claims did not arise in a foreign country because the negligence that
led to the crash74 occurred in California.75 Thus, even though the crash oc-
curred in France, most certainly a foreign country, the plaintiffs were allowed to
recover because the actual acts of negligence took place in the United States.76
Courts, therefore, have the task of determining what negligent act or omis-
sion caused the claimant's injury, as well as where that negligent act or omission
occurred in order to determine whether a claim falls within the foreign country
exception. Many courts allow recovery under a headquarters claim upon finding
that negligence in the United States is very closely connected to an injury
abroad.77 Where a court finds no such connection, it will deny the claim be-
67. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1982).
68. United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949); Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964); Straneri v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 240 (E.D.
Pa. 1948); Brunell v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See supra notes 36-57 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the holdings of these cases.
69. See, e.g., Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), wherein the court stated
that "under the FTCA, a tort claim arises at the place where the negligent act or omission
occurred and not where the negligence had its operative effect." Id. at 1254 (citing Richards v.
United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)); see also Knudsen v. United States, 500 F. Supp. 90
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (all acts with respect to design of aircraft occurred abroad, thus claim arose
abroad); In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (all claims
arose in California).
70. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962).
71. Id. The place where the act or omission has its "operative effect" is the place of the
actual injury or accident. Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 522 n.2 (9th Cir.), cert
denied, 418 U.S. 1070 (1974).
72. 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
73. Id. at 735-36.
74. Id. at 737-38. The alleged negligence included wrongful approval, certification and
inspection of the airplane, and failure to require changes in the structure of the aircraft. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 738.
77. See infra notes 83-126 and accompanying text for a discussion of headquarters claims.
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cause the claim then falls within the foreign country exception. 78
C. Headquarters Claims
1. Recovery based on link between United States and foreign country
Some courts allow plaintiffs to recover under the FTCA, even though they
have sustained injuries in a foreign country, based on a so-called headquarters
claim. 79 In these cases, the claimant's injury, and often some act of negligence,
have occurred in a foreign country.80 The claimant still recovers, however, be-
cause the court ties the injury or the negligence that caused the injury to some
action in the United States.81 To recover under a headquarters claim, the plain-
tiff must connect the injury in a foreign country to a negligent act or omission in
the United States.82 For example, in Leaf v. United States,8 3 owners of an air-
plane sued the United States government for negligence when their plane
crashed during a Drug Enforcement Agency operation in Mexico. 4 The plain-
tiffs based their right to recovery on a headquarters claim, because the planning
of the operation and the leasing of the plane took place in California and Ari-
zona.8 5 The Ninth Circuit held that the claim did not arise in Mexico since the
negligent acts in the United States were the proximate cause of the injury.
8 6
Courts have allowed headquarters claims in a variety of situations similar to
Leaf In Glickman v. United States,87 for example, a district court found that a
CIA program to administer drugs to unwitting persons originated in the United
States even though some of the acts to implement that plan occurred in a foreign
country.88 The plaintiff recovered on a headquarters claim for injuries sustained
as a result of being drugged and electro-shocked as part of the CIA program in
France.89 Since the CIA's negligence in developing and administering the drug
program in the United States caused the plaintiff's injuries in France, the court
allowed the plaintiff's headquarters claim.
90
78. See infra notes 108-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of causation as a bar to
recovery.
79. See, e.g., Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Leaf v. United States,
588 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1978); Glickman v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
80. See Leaf, 588 F.2d at 735.
81. Id. at 736.
82. Id.
83. 588 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1978). In Leaf, the plaintiffs leased their plane to an informant
for the DEA who intended to use the plane to set up a drug smuggler. Id. at 735. The plain-
tiffs were unaware of the use to which the informant intended to put the plane. Id.
84. Yd. at 734-35.
85. Id. at 735.
86. Id. at 736.
87. 626 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
88. Id. at 174.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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Similarly, in Sami v. United States,91 German officials wrongfully detained
the plaintiff in Germany.92 The plaintiff's arrest was the result of an error made
by American officials regarding the plaintiff's capacity to remove his children
from the United States in the midst of a custody battle.93 Although German,
not American, officials made the arrest, the plaintiff was allowed to recover
against the American government.9 4 The District of Columbia court found that
the arrest was made only because of a communique sent from the United States
by the Chief of the United States National Central Bureau (USNCB),95 which is
the United States' liaison with the International Criminal Police Organziation
(Interpol).96 The court therefore held the claim cognizable under the FTCA.
97
Another example is In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation,98
where the district court allowed the plaintiffs to recover for injuries sustained in
Vietnam from exposure to Agent Orange.99 The court found that the initial
decision to use Agent Orange in Vietnam was made in the United States, as was
the decision to continue using it.1°° Decisions relating to the specifications for
Agent Orange also were made in the United States, and the court saw no reason
to attribute mistakes in the use of Agent Orange to Vietnam rather than to the
United States.10 1
These cases, therefore, demonstrate that the key to recovery in headquar-
ters claims cases is connecting the negligent act or omission in the United States
with the injury in a foreign country.10 2 Under this theory, the courts have the
difficult task of determining exactly where the negligence which caused an injury
took place. In some cases, this inquiry also involves an initial determination of
91. 617 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
92. Id. at 758.
93. The Maryland appellate court called this case "an almost incredible history of marital
warfare, with skirmishes occurring up and down the eastern seaboard of this country, as well
as abroad." Sami v. Sami, 29 Md. App. 161, 163-64, 347 A.2d 888, 890 (1975).
94. 617 F.2d at 761-63.
95. The USNCB was, at the time, a bureau of the United States Treasury with eleven full-
time employees whose salaries were paid by the United States government. Id. at 760. The
court found that the USNCB acted "exclusively as an agent of the national [United States]
government which created, staffed, financed and equipped it." Id.
96. Id. at 757-58.
97. Id. at 757.
98. 580 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
99. Id. at 1255. Agent Orange was a chemical used by the United States military to defoli-
ate the jungles of Vietnam. After the war, many soldiers who served in Vietnam experienced
medical problems which they attributed to exposure to Agent Orange. These soldiers began to
sue the chemical companies that had manufactured Agent Orange and voluminous, extremely
complex litigation resulted. For a discussion of the procedural history of the Agent Orange
litigation see the outline recently set out by the editors of the Brooklyn Law Review. Proce-
dural History of the Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 335
(1986).
100. 580 F. Supp. at 1254.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Leaf, 588 F.2d at 735-36.
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which negligent act or omission the court should focus on. 103 Only then can a
court decide whether the negligence occurred in a foreign country.
These cases often involve more than one negligent act. In Agent Orange, for
example, negligent acts in both the United States and Vietnam contributed to
the claimants' injuries. 104 In addition to determining where the negligence oc-
curred, the court also had to decide which of the many negligent acts were sali-
ent to the plaintiffs' claims. This can be a difficult and confusing task, leaving
room for a great deal of error or manipulation. In Agent Orange, the court
could have decided that the negligent use of Agent Orange in Vietnam was the
primary cause of the injury and could therefore have been the sole focus in the
court's decision. The court could have reached an equally valid determination
that the negligence underlying the plaintiffs' claim occurred in Vietnam, since no
clear answer emerged from the facts.
2. Causation as bar to recovery
In several cases, plaintiffs have been unable to recover under a headquarters
claim because they have failed to demonstrate a causal nexus between the negli-
gence and the injury. 10 5 In these cases the courts have found no connection
between an act or omission in the United States and the plaintiffs' injuries in a
foreign country.10 6 Therefore, the courts held that the headquarters claim did
not apply and thus the foreign country exception barred plaintiffs' claims.
10 7
For example, in Eaglin v. United States,10 8 the plaintiff slipped and fell on a
patch of "black ice" on a military base in West Germany. l °9 She claimed that
the United States negligently failed to provide her with adequate warnings about
hazardous weather conditions and failed to instruct her in the proper means to
deal with those conditions. 10 The plaintiff claimed that she should have been
told of the hazards before she left her home in Louisiana.'1 1 The Fifth Circuit
103. For example, in Agent Orange, the court stated that it felt no reason to attribute mis-
takes made in the use of Agent Orange to negligent acts in Vietnam rather than in the United
States. Although there were negligent acts by United States employees in both countries, the
court focused on the negligence in the United States. Id. at 1254-55.
The Agent Orange case exemplifies a court choosing to focus on actions within the United
States when it would be equally plausible to focus on the actions that took place in a foreign
country. It illustrates how courts can manipulate their analyses of the location of negligent
acts to bring a claim within the foreign country exception or, conversely, to allow recovery.
104. Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. at 1255.
105. See, e.g., Eaglin v. United States, 794 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1986); Cominotto v. United
States, 802 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1986). For a discussion of Eaglin, see infra notes 108-12 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of Cominotto, see infra notes 113-18 and accompanying
text.
106. See Eaglin, 794 F.2d at 984; Cominotto, 802 F.2d at 1130-31.
107. See Eaglin, 794 F.2d at 984; Cominotto, 802 F.2d at 1131.
108. 794 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1986).
109. Id. at 982. The plaintiff was a civilian military dependent living on a United States
Army base in West Germany. Id. at 981.
110. Id. at 982.
111. Id.
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found that the plaintiff's generalized allegations of negligent training of military
dependents were too attenuated from the injury to support a headquarters claim
as to a simple slip and fall accident in West Germany.
112
In another case, Cominotto v. United States,' 13the claimant penetrated a
counterfeit operation for the United States Secret Service in Thailand.
114
Although he met with agents in San Francisco and Honolulu, he received spe-
cific instructions in Malaysia.
1 15 The claimant disregarded the instructions
16
and several suspects shot him in the leg.117 The Ninth Circuit held that his
disregard of instructions broke any chain of causation that may have existed
between Secret Service activities overseas and in the United States, and thus a
headquarters claim could not be supported.
1 18
Causation is an issue in all negligence actions.11 9 Eaglin and Cominotto
may well have been correctly decided since claims in which the negligence is too
remote from the injury should not be permitted. 120 However, the courts' ability
to manipulate the causation issue further clouds the application of the foreign
country exception where an existing lack of standards as to where a claim arises
already makes application of the exception difficult enough. For example, the
distinction between a case like Eaglin 12 1 and cases like Glickman 
12 2 and Agent
Orange 123 is difficult to draw. In all three cases, United States officials or em-
ployees in the United States controlled and supervised activities in a foreign
country. 124 Yet, the plaintiffs in Glickman and Agent Orange were permitted to
recover 121 while the plaintiff in Eaglin was not.126 Courts have not set out a
112. Id. at 984. The court found no reason to infer that warnings about black ice should
have been given in the United States. Id. Thus, the court concluded that plaintiff's allegations
of deficient training were unsupportable. Id.
113. 802 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1986).
114. Id. at 1128-29.
115. The agents in Malaysia told Cominotto to meet suspects only in the daytime, only in
public places. They also told him not to get into an automobile or leave the city of Bangkok
with any suspects. Id. at 1129.
116. Cominotto went with suspects, in their car, at night to a farmhouse outside of Bang-
kok. Id. at 1129.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1130-31.
119. See W. KEETON supra note 4, § 41 at 263.
120. Eaglin, 794 F.2d at 981; Cominotto, 802 F.2d at 1127.
121. For a discussion of Eaglin, see supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
122. Glickman v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). For a discussion of
Glickman, see supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
123. Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). For a discussion of Agent Orange,
see supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
124. In Eaglin, the United States Army controlled the military base in West Germany. 794
F. Supp. at 981-82. While day-to-day decisions were made on the base, officials in the United
States ultimately controlled all military activities. In Glickman, CIA officials in the United
States had authority over the operations in France. 626 F. Supp. at 173. In Agent Orange, the
court found the decisions made in the United States concerning the use of Agent Orange con-
trolled over decisions made in Vietnam. 580 F. Supp. at 1255.
125. See supra notes 87-90 and 98-101 and accompanying text.
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clear method for determining when a connection between activities in the United
States and injuries in a foreign country is sufficient to support a headquarters
claim.
IV. ANALYSIS
The decisions made by various courts regarding the foreign country excep-
tion to the FTCA have left a confusing picture. The definition of foreign coun-
try within the meaning of the exception is unsettled.12 7 Additionally, it is
particularly unclear where a court will consider a claim to have arisen.128 In
recent years, the courts have provided only vague decisions about what negli-
gence caused the injury and have not articulated clear methods to determine
where that negligence occurred. 129 An underlying problem with the courts' de-
cisions is that they have become removed from the purposes of the FTCA and
the limitations Congress intended to impose on the foreign country exception.
1 30
The following section explores those purposes and limitations and then demon-
strates how courts have moved away from these underlying goals.
A. The FTCA: Justice and Fair Play
Congress enacted the FTCA "in the interests of justice and fair play" to
give private individuals relief for injuries resulting from the negligence of the
United States government or its employees. 131 Congress' desire to allow suits
against the government arose, at least in part, because of an academic and judi-
cial trend that questioned the continuing acceptability of absolute sovereign im-
126. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 35-66 and accompanying text.
128. This is the problem with the more recent headquarters claim cases. See supra notes 83-
126.
129. Causation has been a major issue for courts in virtually all recent cases dealing with
the foreign country exception. Whether a claimant can show that some negligence in the
United States caused his or her injury is generally determinative of recovery. See supra notes
119-26.
130. See infra notes 131-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the purposes behind
the adoption of the FTCA and the foreign country exception.
131. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, supra note 1, at 43; see also H.R. REP. No. 2428, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. 8 (1940), in which the United States Attorney General encouraged the enactment of
the FTCA by saying:
The subject of tort claims against the Government has long been a troublesome
and vexatious matter. The present system, under which the Government may not be
sued in tort and such claims can receive recognition only as a matter of grace by
private acts of Congress, appears to be not only cumbersome, but also unfair to those
persons who have meritorious claims.... The continued immunity of the Govern-
ment to suit on common law torts does not seem to be warranted either as a matter of
principle or as a matter of justice.
A bill [the FTCA] which represents an attempt to meet this problem by permit-
ting the Government to be sued.., was drafted some time ago .... It passed the
House of Representatives during the Seventy-Sixth Congress. Its enactment would
constitute an important and constructive advance in jurisprudence.
Id; see also supra text accompanying notes 22-34.
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munity.'3 2 Shortly after the enactment of the FTCA, Justice Frankfurter
commented that "a steady change of opinion has gradually undermined continu-
ing acceptance of the sovereign's freedom from ordinary legal responsibility."
133
The abrogation of much of the United States' sovereign immunity regarding tort
claims resulted from a belief that it is unfair for an individual to bear the burden
of an injury that society as a whole should bear.134 When a government em-
ployee's negligence causes an injury, charging losses caused by that injury to the
public treasury spreads that burden over society such that the burden on any one
individual is slight. 135 On the other hand, when the burden falls on one individ-
ual, he or she could be left "destitute or grievously harmed."'1 36 According to
Justice Black, Congress, in enacting the FTCA, "could, and apparently did, de-
cide that this [one individual bearing the entire burden for a Government em-
ployee's negligence] would be unfair when the public as a whole benefits from
the services performed by Government employees."
137
Congress was not willing, however, to strip the United States of all immu-
nity. 1 38 In addition to the general rule under the FTCA holding the United
States liable for its torts, Congress enacted a series of exceptions. 139 However,
exceptions to a statute do not stand alone; they are an integral part of the statute
itself. Therefore, the purposes behind the enactment of each exception must be
132. For example, see Pound, supra note 23, where the author characterized the injustice of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the context of tort claims as follows:
Before 1946 individuals injured by fault or negligence of the federal government
encountered the medieval proposition that the King can do no wrong, taken over by
the popular government of today. In time the government more and more began to
take over and conduct much which had been done by private enterprise. This cre-
ated a serious gap in the administration of justice. If the service was carried on by
individuals those injured through its operations were protected. If it was conducted
by the government there was no redress.
Id. at 689; see also H.R. REP. No. 2428, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 8 (1940).
133. Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 708 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
134. See Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319-20 (1957).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. In United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949), the Court stated that although "Con-
gress was willing to lay aside a great portion of the sovereign's ancient and unquestioned liabil-
ity from suit, it was unwilling to subject the United States to liabilities depending upon the
laws of a foreign power." Id. at 221. In Heller v. United States, 776 F.2d 92 (3rd Cir. 1985),
cert denied, 476 U.S. 1105 (1986), the court noted that "[c]lear congressional consent to suit
for torts committed within the United States by its employees is found in the FTCA. In FTCA
§ 2680(k), however, Congress expressly withheld its consent to suit from " '[a]ny claim arising
in a foreign country."' Id. at 95.
139. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2680(a)-(n) (1982). These exceptions cover a range of activities from
"[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal
matter," id. § 2680(b), to "[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or in-
terference with contract rights," id. § 2680(h). This Comment focuses solely on the exception
of "[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country." Id. § 2680(k).
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reconciled with the basic notions ofjustice and fair play inherent in the adoption
of the FTCA itself.
B. Keeping the United States from Becoming Subject
to the Laws of Another Sovereign
Congress' primary purpose in enacting the foreign country exception was to
insulate the United States from the operation of foreign laws by limiting the
ability of claimants to recover against the United States.140 But, while courts
have repeatedly reiterated this purpose,14 1 they have lost sight of it when analyz-
ing cases. In many of the cases in which the court's primary focus was to define
foreign country,1 42 those courts determined that a claim would not be allowed
because the claim occurred at a place where another nation was technically sov-
ereign."' Consistent with the exception's purpose, courts should conduct two
inquiries to determine whether the United States would be subject to the laws of
another sovereign. To apply the foreign country exception, a court must deter-
mine: (1) whether the tort occurred in a jurisdiction outside United States sov-
ereignty; and (2) whether foreign law would necessarily apply in a given case. 44
Many of the courts that have construed the foreign country exception have
reached the first prong and then stopped. 145 But, the fact that another nation
may technically have sovereignty over a particular place does not necessarily
mean that the United States would be subject to the laws of that sovereign if
sued for negligence. For example, in Meredith v. United States,14 6 the Ninth
Circuit did not allow the plaintiff to recover because itpresumed that the law to
be applied would be the law of Thailand, since "obviously our embassy in Bang-
kok has no tort law of its own." 147 Twenty-one years later, the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit reached the opposite result. In Beattie v. United States,1 4 8 the
court determined that the foreign country exception did not apply to Antarctica
140. H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1942).
141. See, eg., Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 762-63 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("It was not, we
think, the difficulty of ascertaining foreign law but the prospect of unreasonably imposed liabil-
ity which actuated the exemption.") (footnotes omitted); Brunell v. United States, 77 F. Supp.
68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) ("Congress... did not consent to expose the Government to claims
predicated on the laws of a foreign country").
142. See, eg., Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867
(1964); Burna v. United States, 240 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1957); Brunell v. United States, 77 F.
Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Straneri v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
143. See, eg., Burna, 240 F.2d at 721 (Japan retained residual sovereignty over Okinawa);
Straneri, 77 F. Supp. at 241 (United States occupation of Belgium after World War II did not
bring Belgium within sovereignty of United States).
144. Heller v. United States, 776 F.2d 92, 95-96 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1105
(1986).
145. For example, in Straneri, 77 F. Supp. at 241, the court stated that any lands outside
the boundaries of the United States "or its territories or possessions" were foreign countries.
146. 330 F.2d 9 (9th Cir.), cerm denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964).
147. Id. at 10.
148. 756 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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precisely because Antarctica had no tort law of its own.14 9 Neither court, how-
ever, offered concrete reasons for its results. Consequently, whether the absence
of "local" law dictates that the foreign country exception applies remains
unclear.
Under the FTCA, the law to be applied is "the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred."' 50 Another nation's sovereignty over the land on
which a United States military base or embassy is located is not, however, deter-
minative of the fact that the foreign sovereign's law must be applied.1 51 United
States law may apply on overseas military bases and embassies, 152 and conflict of
laws principles may dictate that the United States law is the one that should be
applied. 153 Many courts, applying the foreign country exception, have denied
claimants relief without determining that foreign law was necessarily the one to
be applied. 154 The courts' approach, while seemingly in accordance with the
purpose of the foreign country exception, may actually subvert the purposes of
the FrCA. A better approach would remain within the limitations of the for-
eign country exception without undue interference with the purposes of the
FTCA. In the following sections, this Comment explores such an approach.
C. Reconciling Foreign Country Exception Cases and the FTCA
Congress enacted the FTCA to give relief to meritorious claimants who,
because of the United States' sovereign immunity, were otherwise unable to re-
cover unless they brought a private bill for reparations to Congress.15 5 The for-
eign country exception limited the liability of the United States by excluding
"claims arising in a foreign country." 15 6 This limiting exception must be in-
voked only in a manner consistent with the rest of the statute. Therefore, in
accord with the statutory intent, the foreign country exception should be used to
deny relief only when absolutely necessary. Nevertheless, many courts have
149. Id. at 105 (emphasis added).
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
151. Had this been determinative, the court in Meredith would not have had to presume
that foreign law applied. Meredith, 330 F.2d at 10. The applicability of foreign law would not
have been subject to any doubt.
152. See infra notes 235-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether United
States law should apply to overseas military bases and embassies.
153. For example, see In re Air Crash Disaster Near Saigon, South Vietnam on April 4,
1975, 476 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C. 1979) [hereinafter Saigon Air Crash] wherein the court used
an "interest analysis" conflict of laws approach to determine that the United States interests in
the crash outweighed those of South Vietnam where the crash occurred. Id. at 526-28. The
court thus held that United States law should apply. Id. at 529.
154. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
155. H.R. REP. No. 2428, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 8 (1940). See supra notes 131-39 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of the notions of justice and fair play underlying the enact-
ment of the FTCA.
156. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1982). See supra notes 140-53 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the purposes behind the enactment of the foreign tountry exception.
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broadly interpreted the exception although a narrow reading is more consistent
with both the purposes of the exception and of the FTCA in general.
The present broad reading of the foreign country exception by the courts
has left many claimants with only private bills to Congress as a form of relief.
While acknowledging that these cases often present problems with which judges
can sympathize, 1 ' 7courts often state that the problem is one best left to adminis-
trative or political means, or to special legislation' 5 -- precisely the result Con-
gress sought to avoid when it enacted the FrCA.159
1. Overbroad definition of foreign country
Courts' present approach to the definition of foreign country is both unjus-
tified, unnecessary and overbroad. A more narrow definition could accomplish
the goals of the foreign country exception and at the same time afford relief to a
greater number of claimants.
Historical perspective reveals Congress' purposes in enacting the foreign
country exception. At the time that Congress adopted the exception, 160 the
world was in a state of turmoil and unrest.1 6 1 Suspicion and distrust of foreign
countries and their laws was a natural result of the world situation. Not surpris-
ingly, Congress wanted to avoid subjecting the United States to the laws of an-
other sovereign.
1 62
157. See, eg., Burna v. United States, 240 F.2d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 1957) ("The facts alleged
present an appealing human problem, and if we were free to grant relief in such a case there
would be every moral basis for doing so.").
158. Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9, 11 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964).
The court in Meredith noted that:
Provisions of a number of other statutes point to a Congressional intention that
claims for property damage, personal injury, or death arising out of activities of our
military and civilian personnel abroad are to be dealt with by administrative or diplo-
matic means, or by special legislation, as may be appropriate, rather than by litiga-
tion under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Id. (citations omitted).
However, one of the principal reasons for the enactment of the FTCA was to eliminate
private bills of relief ("special legislation") because the time-consuming process was "not only
cumbersome but also unfair to those persons who ha[d] meritorious claims." H.R. REP. No.
2428, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 8 (1940).
Thus, the FTCA, enacted for the specific purpose of avoiding private bills of relief, should
be considered on its own. The fact that other statutes indicate that certain behavior is best left
to "special legislation" is not indicative of congressional intent regarding the FTCA, especially
in light of the clear intent expressed by Congress in enacting the FTCA.
159. H.R. REP. No. 2428, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 8 (1940).
160. Congress considered bills that eventually became the FTCA from 1919 until it was
passed in its present form in 1946. United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 220 n.6 (1949).
161. The United States, as well as most of Europe and the Far East, was either in the midst
of or recovering from either World War I (1914-1918) or World War I (1939-1945) during
the entire time that the FTCA was debated in Congress.
162. See Spelar, 338 U.S. at 221, where the Court, when discussing the passage of the
FTCA stated: "Congress... was unwilling to submit the United States to liabilities depending
upon the laws of a foreign power." Id.; see also supra notes 140-53 and accompanying text.
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In the years following World Wars I and II, countries became much more
interrelated and thus the definition of foreign country blurred. In 1949, when
the United States Supreme Court decided United States v. Spelar,163 Justice
Frankfurter stated that, "[tihe very concept of 'sovereignty' is in a state of more
or less solution these days;' 64 the "entangling relationships" 165 between the
United States and other nations make the term "foreign country" difficult to
define.1 66 It seems clear that, as Justice Frankfurter concluded, "[a] 'foreign
country' in which the United States has no territorial control does not bear the
same relation to the United States as a 'foreign country' in which the United
States does have territorial control."
167
For purposes of other congressional legislation, 168 courts have determined
that military bases on foreign soil are United States possessions. 169 The FTCA
clearly extends to possessions of the United States.1 70 As stated by one court, a
requirement for recovery under the FTCA is that "the tort must have been com-
mitted on lands within the boundaries of the United States or its territories or
possessions."' 17 1 Thus, military bases must logically be viewed as non-foreign
countries. Courts dealing with the foreign country exception, however, have
refused to consider overseas military bases and embassies as United States
possessions. 172
In Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell,173 the United States Supreme Court
considered this distinction in the context of the Fair Labor Standards Act and
deemed United States military bases in Newfoundland to be United States pos-
sessions. 174 Nevertheless, the Court had no trouble finding the same military
bases that it deemed possessions in Vermilya-Brown to be foreign countries in
163. 338 U.S. 217 (1949).
164. Id. at 224 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 223 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 224 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
167. Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
168. E.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 28 U.S.C. § 201 (1982).
169. See, for example, Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1949), in which the
Court held that an employee who worked overtime on a United States air base in Newfound-
land could maintain an action for extra wages, penalties and interest because the base was a
United States possession for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. at 380; see also
infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
170. Straneri v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 240, 241 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
171. Id. (emphasis added).
172. See Spelar, 338 U.S. at 219 (long-term lease of airbase from Great Britain to United
States did not transfer sovereignty to United States; thus, base was not United States posses-
sion); see also Straneri, 77 F. Supp. at 241 & n.3, in which the court limited "the United States
or its territories and possessions" to "[tihe forty-eight States, including the District of Colum-
bia and federal reservations, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Canal Zone,
Guam, Samoa and other Pacific Island possessions." Id.
173. 335 U.S. 377 (1949).
174. Vermilya-Brown dealt with claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act rather than the
FrCA, but the same military bases that were involved in Spelar, located in Newfoundland and
leased to the United States from Great Britain for 99 years, were involved. Id.
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United States v. Spelar, a case dealing with the foreign country exception. 175
Concurring in Spelar, Justice Frankfurter discussed the difficulty of defining the
term foreign country, but agreed that under the FTCA the military bases were
foreign countries.1 76 Justice Jackson, in a concurrence, stated that if the Spelar
decision was inconsistent with Vermilya-Brown, the Court should have retreated
from Vermilya-Brown. 177 If courts are to stay within the purposes and goals of
the FTCA,178 however, they should retreat from the Spelar approach.
2. Away from justice and fairness
The courts should not be so quick to distinguish a case like Vermilya-
Brown. If such a case were followed, rather than distinguished, claimants could
recover under the FTCA even when their claims arose on overseas military bases
or embassies. Narrowing the foreign country exception would better serve the
interests of fairness and justice by permitting more meritorious claimants to re-
cover under the FTCA.
17 9
Many of the claimants harmed by the foreign country exception are over-
seas, serving in some sort of governmental service.1 0 These claimants must be
allowed to recover if the foreign country exception is to be reconciled with the
purposes and goals of the FTCA itself. For example, the spouse of a United
States serviceperson18 1 stationed overseas may not be able to recover for govern-
175. Spelar, 338 U.S. at 218-19. See supra text accompanying notes 44-51 for a discussion
of the facts of Spelar.
176. Id. at 224 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 225 (Jackson, 3., concurring).
178. See supra. notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
179. The courts' approach, however, is not overbroad with respect to certain claimants.
For example, when an alien brings a suit against the United States, the bar to recovery set out
by the foreign country exception is not unjust and unfair to the extent that it is when an
American citizen is involved. While as a matter of policy a government should compensate
those whom it injures, the interest in such compensation may be greater when it is a sover-
eign's own citizens who have been injured. There is support for this in the legislative history of
the FTCA. An early version of the foreign country exception exempted claims "arising in a
foreign country in behalf of an alien." H.R. 5373, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. § 303(12) (1942).
Although the final version of the exception did not contain the phrase "in behalf of an alien,"
H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. § 402(12) (1942), the principle behind excluding such claims is
sound.
Additionally, an alien presumably has more recourse in his or her own country, which has
a strong interest in protecting its own citizens, than does an American stationed in that coun-
try. Thus, an alien is more likely to be able to recover against a United States official or
employee sued in his or her personal capacity in a foreign country than is an American in the
same situation.
180. The majority of cases in which courts have dealt with the foreign country exception
have concerned injuries occurring on United States military bases or embassies on foreign soil.
See United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949) (United States air base in Newfoundland);
Eaglin v. United States, 794 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1986) (United States army base in West Ger-
many); Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964)
(United States embassy in Bangkok, Thailand).
181. The ability of members of the United States military to recover under the FTCA raises
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mental torts. The same spouse would have no trouble recovering if the ser-
viceperson were stationed on a base in the United States.18 2 This result is
potentially unequitable.
Congress enacted the FTCA because of the unfairness in not permitting
claimants to recover against the government when those same claimants could
have recovered had they been injured by private individuals. 183 Sending Ameri-
cans and their families abroad, as the United States government does with mili-
tary and embassy personnel, then not allowing them to recover when injured by
United States officials or employees is particularly unfair. Thus, through their
broad approach to the foreign country exception, courts have moved away from
the purposes of the FTCA-and away from fairness.
Admittedly, the purposes of the FTCA do not stand alone. The foreign
country exception cases must also be reconciled with the purposes of the excep-
tion itself."8 4 While courts have moved away from the purposes of the
FCA,1 8 they have generally kept within the purposes of the foreign country
exception by refusing to explore whether foreign law necessarily applies in a
given case.1 8 6 Courts assume that foreign law applies and thus state that be-
cause Congress intended the foreign country exception to insulate the United
States from the laws of another sovereign, the foreign country exception bars
recovery. 18 7 The courts' practice of simply assuming that foreign law applies
results in many claimants with otherwise meritorious claims being denied recov-
ery.18 8 That result does not coincide with the idea that under the FTCA, for
reasons of fairness, meritorious plaintiffs should be allowed recovery.
Fairness and justice as contemplated by Congress in enacting the FTCA
remain the ultimate goals in tort claims against the United States.18 9 In light of
these goals, courts are applying the foreign country exception too broadly.
Cases involving foreign countries may also implicate other concerns, such as the
applicability of foreign law. Even in those cases, however, courts can reach
more equitable results, without subjecting the United States to foreign law, by
narrowing the foreign country exception. The narrowing of the foreign country
other problems and issues that are beyond the scope of this Comment. See Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), for a discussion of the primary bar to recovery under the FTCA
for members of the military.
182. The foreign country exception does not come into play in such situations, because the
bar to recovery under the FTCA is removed.
183. See H.R. REP. No. 2428, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 8 (1940).
184. See supra notes 140-53 and accompanying text.
185. The FTCA is primarily concerned with fairness and justice. See supra notes 131-39
and accompanying text.
186. Congress enacted the foreign country exception to keep the United States from being
subjected to the laws of another sovereign. H.R. REP. No. 2428, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 8 (1940).
See supra notes 140-53 and accompanying text.
187. See, eg., Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 379 U.S. 867
(1964).
188. Id.
189. See H.R. REP. No. 2428, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 8 (1940).
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exception is essential if the courts are to remain true to the focus of the FTCA.
Courts can accomplish this narrowing without undermining the purposes of the
foreign country exception by looking more closely at the law to be applied in the
particular situation.
D. Reconciling Foreign Country Exception Cases with the Congressional
Purpose Behind the Foreign Country Exception Itself
Determining whether an area is a foreign country does not end the inquiry
under a foreign country exception analysis.1 90 Although several early cases
found that the foreign country exception applied to any area outside of United
States boundaries, its territories or its possessions,191 Congress did not intend a
strictly geographical limitation.1 92 The following language, which would have
imposed a positive geographical limitation on the FTCA, was proposed as an
exception to the FTCA in 1940: "This act shall be applicable only to damages
or injury occurring within the geographical limits of the United States, Alaska,
Hawaii, Puerto Rico or the Canal Zone."1 93 Yet Congress chose not to adopt
this language, and did not put any strict geographical limitation on the
FrCA.1 9 4 Congress chose instead the negative limitation 95 of the foreign coun-
190. To bring a claim within the foreign country exception a court must determine both:
(1) that the tort occurred in a jurisdiction outside United States sovereignty; and (2) that the
United States is subject to liability based on foreign law. Heller v. United States, 776 F.2d 92,
95-96 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1105 (1986).
191. For example, in Straneri v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. Pa. 1948), the court
stated that:
[A]s one of the conditions precedent to recovery from the United States, the tort
must have been committed on lands within the boundaries of the United States, or its
territories or possessions. All other lands are to be considered as foreign country
[sic] irrespective of the degree of control the executive branch of the United States
government might otherwise exert over them.
Id. at 241; see also Brunell v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) ("Although...
Saipan was in the possession and under the control of the United States by reason of military
conquest and occupation, it cannot in any sense be deemed to have been either a component
part or a political subdivision of this nation."). Id. at 72.
192. Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Beattie court explored
the legislative history of the foreign country exception, id. at 94-95, and then stated:
Although the legislative history does not point decisively to any answer, the
weight of the evidence is in favor of the concept that Congress did not intend to limit
the application of the FTCA to the United States and its territories and posses-
sions .... Rather, the legislative will seems to be as the Supreme Court summarized
it in Spelar, that "though Congress was ready to lay aside a great portion of the
sovereign's ancient and unquestioned immunity from suit, it was unwilling to subject
the United States to liabilities depending upon the laws of a foreign power."
Id. at 95 (citing United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 221 (1949)).
193. Id. at 94 (quoting Hearings on S. 2690 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 38 (1940)).
194. Id. at 95.
195. The current foreign country exception is a negative limitation in the sense that it states
that "[t]he provisions of... section 1346 [the FTCA] shall not apply to ... (k) [a]ny claim
arising in a foreign country." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1982) (emphasis added). The alternative
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try exception, making the exception a statement of where the "FTCA will not
apply rather than where it will.
196
Congress' choice has made the courts' work more difficult. No easily appli-
cable standard can be gleaned from the language of the exception. Although
courts have accepted the proposition that the foreign country exception was
meant to prevent the United States from becoming subject to the laws of another
nation,1 97 they have had trouble translating this purpose into consistent rulings.
Courts have used two basic methods, one that allows claims 198 and one that
does not,19 9 in an attempt to stay within the command of Congress and keep the
United States free from liabilities imposed under the law of another sovereign.
1. Assumption that foreign law applies
One judicial approach has been to assume that foreign law applies in a given
situation, thereby giving the claimant no opportunity to recover under the
FTCA. At least one court has explicitly used this approach and several others
have used it by implication. Meredith v. United States,2° ° a 1964 Ninth Circuit
case, is the best example of a court assuming without analysis that foreign law
applied. Acknowledging that the purpose of the foreign country exception was
to prevent the United States from being subject to the laws of another sovereign,
the court stated that "obviously our embassy at Bangkok has no tort law of its
own." 20 1 That being the case, the court determined that "[p]resumably the law
applicable on these premises would be that of Thailand," and thus the foreign
country exception would apply to bar recovery.20 2 This presumption is not nec-
essarily a valid one.
There are several reasons why United States law should apply to cases in-
volving American citizens and the United States government which arise out of
incidents taking place on military bases and embassies abroad. Chief among
these reasons is that otherwise the United States government can send its citi-
zens abroad and abandon its responsiblity to them. Although a sovereign can
decide when it will permit itself to be sued, it seems particularly unfair to deny
approach, involving a positive limitation, would have been that which was suggested to Con-
gress: restricting the FTCA to a specific geographic area. See Beattie, 756 F.2d at 94.
196. See id. at 94-95.
197. See United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 221 (1949) (Congress unwilling to subject
United States to laws of foreign power); Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 762 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (exemption actuated by prospect of unreasonable liability based on foreign law); Brunell,
77 F. Supp. at 72 (Congress did not consent to exposing United States to claims based on law
of foreign countries).
198. See, e.g., Glickman v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Paris Air
Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
199. See, e.g., Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867
(1964).
200. 330 F.2d 9 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964).
201. Id. at 10.
202. Id.
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recovery to those citizens who are sent abroad in government service.20 3
In Beattie v. United States,2° 4 the negligence of United States Navy air traf-
fic control personnel occurred in an area that had no tort law of its own-Ant-
arctica. The court found that the foreign country exception should not apply.
205
Although Antarctica is one of the largest continents in the world, it has no sov-
ereign. 20 6 In Beattie, the court decided that since there was no sovereign, and
thus no indigenous law, there was no reason that the foreign country exception
should apply.
20 7
This principle-not applying the foreign country exception when there is
no indigenous law-should also apply to United States military bases, embassies,
and other government installations located on foreign soil. Concededly, there
are differences between a place like Antarctica, which has no indigenous law of
its own, and a United States base on foreign soil, which is situated in a location
that does. In fact, the key distinction between cases like Beattie and cases like
Meredith is that in the Meredith-type cases a foreign sovereign power encom-
passes the area in which United States bases and embassies are located, and in
the Beattie-type cases there is an absence of foreign sovereignty.2 0 8 Neverthe-
less, as in Antarctica the United States retains enforcement power over foreign
country outposts and over the people who inhabit them.2 °9
Thus, courts should consider United States bases and embassies overseas to
be in positions similar to the "no man's land" of Antarctica. The nations on
which these bases sit retain sovereignty, yet the United States retains enforce-
ment power; neither nation is solely in control.2 10 Therefore, although a mili-
tary base or embassy may technically have no law of its own, no compelling
203. See infra notes 235-42 and accompanying text.
204. 756 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
205. Id. at 98.
206. Id. at 93.
207. Id. at 98.
208. The United States has treaties with many of these nations which recognize the sover-
eignty of the nation in which the installation is located. See, e.g., Heller, 776 F.2d at 96 n.3
(citing Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of the Phillipines
Concerning Military Bases, March 14, 1947, as amended January 7, 1979, 30 U.S.T. 863,
T.I.A.S. No. 9224).
209. Id.
210. The Agreement between the United States and the Phillipines, cited in Heller, provides
as follows:
1. The bases covered by this Agreement are Phillippine military bases and shall be
under the command of Phillipine Base Commanders.
2. The United States Commanders shall exercise command and control over the
United States Facility, over United States Military personnel, over civilian personnel
in the employ of the United States Forces, over United States equipment and mate-
rial, and over military operations involving United States Forces.
3. In the performance of their duties, the Base Commanders and the United States
Commanders shall be guided by full respect for Phillippine sovereignty on the one
hand and the assurance of unhampered United States military operation on the
other.
Id. (citing Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of the Phillip-
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reason exists to apply the law of the foreign nation rather than that of the United
States. On the other hand, at least one reason2 11 exists to apply the law of the
United States: the congressional intent behind the FTCA.212
Where United States law can be applied it should be applied so that these
claimants are not left "destitute or grievously harmed., 2 13 In accordance with
this principle, in cases such as Meredith, where there is some basis for applying
the law of the United States, the courts should do so. Courts have not hesitated
to apply United States law when given the choice between United States law or
the law of an unfriendly sovereign. For example, in In re Agent Orange Product
Liability Litigation,21 the court focused on the law of the United States rather
than the law of Vietnam, even though the injuries and much of the negligence
had occurred in Vietnam.2 15 The court found no policy reason to apply the
foreign country exception since South Vietnam, where Agent Orange was used,
no longer existed and "North Vietnam, the jurisdiction that has replaced South
Vietnam. . . , was at war with the United States and it was in the prosecution of
the war that the exposure to Agent Orange took place."
2 16
Where a possibility exists that United States law could be applied, such as
on overseas military bases and embassies, the courts should not restrict them-
selves as the court did in Meredith.2 17 Rather, the courts should apply the prin-
ciple espoused in Agent Orange to all areas where there may be policy reasons
for choosing United States law over foreign law,21 ' not just in areas where there
pines Concerning Military Bases, March 14, 1947, as amended January 7, 1979, 30 U.S.T. 863,
879, T.I.A.S. No. 9224).
211. There are other reasons as well. For example, in the majority of the foreign country
exception cases, a conflict-of-laws "interest analysis," as set out by the District of Columbia
Circuit in Saigon Air Crash, 476 F. Supp. 521, 526-27 (D.D.C. 1979) would nearly always
counsel for the application of United States, rather than foreign, law. The primary interest
pointing to application of United States law is the United States federal government's interest
in its "courts providing a just and reasonable resolution of claims" in cases involving govern-
ment negligence. Id. at 527.
212. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
213. Rayonier v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957).
214. 580 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
215. The court stated that it was not clear where the majority of the negligence had oc-
curred, and as long as it was at least questionable, there was no reason to apply the law of
Vietnam. Id. at 1255.
216. Id. at 1254 (citing In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 690,
707 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)). See also Saigon Air Crash, 476 F. Supp. at 527-28, in which the court
held that the interests of the United States were "paramount" over any interests of Vietnam.
Although Saigon Air Crash dealt with a wrongful death statute, rather than the FTCA, the
principle is the same-in a case in which the United States has the strongest interest in the
claimants' recovery, United States law should be applied. A concern about possible interfer-
ence with another nation's sovereignty must be taken into account when courts balance the
interests involved. Courts should apply United States law only when the United States inter-
ests, especially the interest in compensating the claimant, emerge as the strongest interests of
all those implicated in a suit.
217. Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964).
218. See supra notes 160-86 and accompanying text.
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is a hostile sovereign. Courts can stay within the bounds of the foreign country
exception with a narrower approach by looking more closely at what law can
and should apply, rather than by making assumptions as the court did in
Meredith.
2. Headquarters claims
Other courts have taken an entirely different approach.21 ' The allowance
of a headquarters claim permits a claimant to recover since at least part of the
negligence is found to have occurred in the United States.220 A headquarters
claim case falls outside of the foreign country exception's prohibition against
claims "arising in a foreign country,, 22 1 because a court finds that the claim, or
part of the claim, actually arose in the United States. For example, in Glickman
v. United States,222 the claimant was drugged and electro-shocked as part of a
CIA operation in France.223 Even though many of the acts that caused the
injury occurred in France, the plaintiff recovered because the court found that
the program originated in the United States.
224
This course of action is consistent with both the purpose of the foreign
country exception2M5 and the purpose of the FTCA,226 but it does not clearly
define when a claim will be allowed. The difficulty lies in the very nature of tort
law. A tort committed in the United States can have far-reaching repercussions.
This is especially clear in cases involving plane crashes. For example, in In re
Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974,22 7 negligent inspection and certification of a
plane in the United States resulted in the crash of that plane in Paris, France.
228
Those injured by the crash should clearly have been able to recover against the
United States, since the United States is responsible for inspecting planes and
certifying them to fly. In analyzing the cases under the FTCA, the place to be
considered is where an act or omission occurred, not where that act or omission
had its operative effect.229 In a plane crash case, these places are clearly distinct,
and applying the foreign country exception is not necessary under a headquar-
ters claim analysis.
219. See Glickman v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Paris Air
Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
220. See supra notes 83-126 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases applying head-
quarters claims.
221. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1982).
222. 626 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
223. Id. at 174.
224. Id.
225. The purpose of the foreign country exception is to insulate the United States from
liability based on the laws of another sovereign. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying
text.
226. The primary purpose of the FTCA is to allow meritorious claimants to recover against
the United States for its torts. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
227. 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
228. Id. at 737.
229. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962).
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On the other hand, in many foreign country exception cases, applying head-
quarters claim analysis is much less clear. Generally, headquarters claims are
permitted where the claimant can show that the negligence involved somehow
originated in the United States.230 Where there is a break in causation, as in all
tort cases, claimants may not recover.231
Foreign country exception cases are even more complicated than ordinary
tort cases. Several more possible intervening factors arise in foreign country
exception cases, because great distances, and often time lags, are involved.
While claimants who cannot show any connection to the United States should
properly be denied recovery, those claimants who do allege a connection should
be given every opportunity to proceed on their claim.
The courts' current approach to headquarters claims leaves potential claim-
ants with little guidance as to when a claim will be allowed. Some courts refuse
to recognize headquarters claims at all.2 32 This refusal reflects too narrow an
approach. The allowance of headquarters claims should therefore be broadened,
rather than narrowed, since such broadening could be accomplished within the
bounds of the foreign country exception while allowing more claimants to re-
cover, thereby achieving the purposes of the FTCA.
V. PROPOSAL
A strictly geographical approach to the definition of foreign country is
clearly incorrect.23 3 Courts must focus on the law to be applied in a particular
situation. The foreign country exception should be construed as prohibiting
cases arising under foreign law, rather than prohibiting those that arise in a
foreign country in a strictly geographical sense.23 4 This could occur in several
230. See Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (plaintiff recovered for
wrongful arrest in Germany by German officials since arrest was result of communique from
United States' liaison with Interpol); Leaf v. United States, 588 F.2d 733, 736 (9th Cir. 1978)
(plaintiff recovered for loss of plane in Mexico during drug operation where planning of opera-
tion and leasing of plane took place in California and Arizona); Glickman, 626 F. Supp. at 174
(plaintiff recovered for injuries resulting from being drugged and electro-shocked in France
since CIA program to administer drugs originated in the United States).
231. See Cominotto v. United States, 802 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff denied recov-
ery because he disregarded instructions given by United States Secret Service agents in United
States and Malaysia, thus breaking chain of causation that may have existed between those
instructions and his injury in Thailand); Eaglin v. United States, 794 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1986)
(plaintiff denied recovery for injuries suffered as a result of slip and fall in Germany because
connection between failure to warn before she left United States and accident too remote).
232. See, eg., Grunch v. United States, 538 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
233. This is apparent based both on courts' language, Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91,
95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("the weight of the evidence is in favor of the concept that Congress did
not intend to limit the application of the FTCA to the United States and its territories and
possessions"), and on the fact that courts have not limited their decisions to a strict geographi-
cal interpretation. This is evidenced by the fact that courts have allowed many claims in which
an injury occurred in a foreign country.
234. The legislative history supports this construction. See supra notes 141-53 and accom-
panying text.
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ways.
A. Defining Foreign Country
1. Military bases and embassies
In the case of United States military bases and embassies located on foreign
soil, foreign law should not necessarily apply.235 The relationship of bases and
embassies to the United States is such that they should be treated as though they
are United States possessions, rather than as foreign countries.23 6 The United
States exercises a great deal of control over foreign bases. Foreign installations
are like miniature cities that are virtually self-contained. United States citizens
make up the populations of these "cities." If bases and embassies are treated as
United States possessions, the foreign country exception would not apply,237 and
persons injured by the United States on those bases and embassies could recover
under the FTCA. 238 Additionally, the fairness policies behind the adoption of
the FTCA provide a strong incentive for courts to apply United States rather
than foreign law to overseas military bases and embassies.239
Conflict of laws interest analysis also makes it clear that United States law
should apply to bases and embassies located on foreign soil, at least when the
claimant is a United States citizen. 2' The United States has a strong interest in
permitting recovery by its own citizens, stronger than any interest that the for-
eign country in which the injury may have occurred has. 241 Based on these
policy considerations it does not, as one court suggested, seem "reasonable that
torts occurring on American military bases are barred by the foreign country
exception, despite the fact that the enforcement authority on base is
American."2 42
2. Broadened headquarters claims
In other cases, United States law must be applied because the tort occurred
entirely, or in part, in the United States. These are the headquarters claim
cases.243 The headquarters claim should not be abandoned or denied by
235. See supra notes 168-78 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 168-78 and accompanying text.
237. Even courts that take a geographical approach to the foreign country exception recog-
nize United States territories and possessions as within the geographical realm of the United
States. See, eg., Straneri v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 240, 241 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
238. Under this approach, if courts apply United States law, deserving claimants can re-
cover under the FTCA, notwithstanding the foreign country exception. On the other hand, if
courts apply foreign law, the foreign country exception bars recovery for otherwise meritorious
claimants.
239. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
241. See Saigon Air Crash, 476 F. Supp. 521, 527-29 (D.D.C. 1979).
242. Heller v. United States, 776 F.2d 92, 97 (3d Cir. 1985), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1105
(1986).
243. See supra notes 83-126 and accompanying text.
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courts, 244 but rather should be broadly defined. When the United States govern-
ment causes an injury it should compensate for that injury.24 5 Courts should
not deny recovery merely because the injury resulting from government negli-
gence in the United States occurred in a foreign country.246 Any legitimate con-
nection to the United States should be allowed to be the basis for a headquarters
Cr
24 7
claim.24
Allowing broadly defined headquarters claims will not disturb the goals un-
derlying the foreign country exception. Since the negligence in such cases oc-
curred in the United States, there is no basis for applying foreign law. The
purpose of the foreign country exception is to prevent the application of foreign
law,248 not recovery by claimants whose injury happened to occur in a foreign
country. A broad approach will also help attain the primary goal of the
FTCA-recovery for meritorious claimants.24 9 Courts should thus give claim-
ants a great deal of leeway in presenting their cases. Unless there is a definite
break in causation between negligence in the United States and injury in a for-
eign country,25 ° the claim should be allowed.
B. What Law Applies
One problem with the proposition that United States law should apply to
overseas military bases and embassies is the question of what law to apply. One
court stated that "it is [not] the duty of the federal courts to create rules gov-
erning liability for tortious acts and omissions on the premises of American em-
bassies and consulates abroad.",25 ' While the legislature may ultimately have to
formulate such rules, this area should be "admitted as [an] additional exception
to the proposition that there is no federal general common law.",
252
However, the problem of deciding what law is applicable occurs less fre-
quently in the headquarters claims cases than in the military bases or embassy
cases. This is so because, in order to bring a headquarters claim, the plaintiff
244. See Grunch v. United States, 538 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Mich. 1982) wherein the court
refused to "recognize a 'continuing negligence' cause of action which suffices to override the
'foreign country' exception of the FTCA." Id. at 537.
245. This was the result contemplated by Congress when it enacted the FTCA. See supra
notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
246. Under the FTCA courts are directed to look at the place of the tort rather than of the
injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). See also Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962).
247. See supra notes 83-126 and accompanying text for a discussion of the courts' current
approach to headquarters claims. The current approach takes a much more narrow view than
that suggested here.
248. See supra notes 140-53 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
250. See Cominotto v. United States, 802 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff ignored instruc-
tions and was subsequently shot in leg); for a full discussion of Cominotto, see supra notes 113-
18 and accompanying text.
251. Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9, 10 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964).
252. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Torts, 44 U. COLO.
L. REv. 1, 79 (1972).
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must show a connection with some specific act in the United States.253 The law
applied can then be the law of the place where that act occurred. The headquar-
ters principle could also be applied in the case of military bases and embassies
abroad to decide what law should apply. The conflict-of-laws interest analysis
conducted by the Court in Saigon Air Crash demonstrates that the connection
between the United States and military and diplomatic outposts abroad is quite
strong.25 4 Communication between the United States and the embassy or base
is often constant. Broad policy decisions governing the embassies or bases are
made in the United States, and the ultimate authority over the embassies or
bases rests in the United States. Thus, based on interest analysis, the law to be
applied at an overseas base should be that required by the choice of law rules of
the jurisdiction in the United States where the ultimate authority over that base
is located.
255
By using such an approach, the areas in which the United States would be
subjected to the laws of another sovereign would be narrowed and the foreign
country exception would consequently be narrowed as well. Thus, even though
the foreign country exception would be applied in fewer cases, Congress' pur-
pose of not permitting claims in cases where the United States would be subject
to the laws of another sovereign would still be served. Additionally, this ap-
proach makes it more probable that meritorious plaintiffs would recover-the
result intended by Congress.
256
VI. CONCLUSION
In acknowledgment of the fact that sovereign immunity in many cases is no
longer fair or necessary, Congress in 1946 enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Under the FTCA meritorious claimants are able to recover against the federal
government as they would against a private party. However, because of the
broad approach taken by the courts to the foreign country exception to the
FTCA, many otherwise meritorious claimants are denied recovery. The policy
and purposes behind the FTCA, as well as those behind the foreign country
exception, point to a different result.
In order to reach fairer results in cases involving the foreign country excep-
tion, courts must do several things. First, they must redefine the term foreign
country as it is used in the FTCA. The focus must be on the law to be applied
rather than on geographical boundaries. Second, courts must not apply the for-
eign country exception to cases involving military bases and embassies on for-
eign soil. Third, courts should continue to base recovery on headquarters claims
and should allow recovery whenever there is a legitimate connection between
253. See supra notes 83-126 and accompanying text.
254. See Saigon Air Crash, 476 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C. 1979).
255. In many cases this would most likely be laws of the District of Columbia or adjacent
states such as Virginia, where most of the ultimate authority for acts of the federal government
are located.
256. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
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negligence in the United States and an injury in a foreign country. These steps
would lead to a more narrow foreign country exception, under which a greater
number of deserving claimants would recover.
This Comment has examined the policy and purposes behind the FTCA, as
well as those behind the foreign country exception. In terms of those policies
and purposes, the courts' current approach to cases involving the foreign coun-
try exception is unnecessary and unwarranted. A narrower approach to the for-
eign country exception would be more consistent with the policy goals of the
FTCA and at the same time address more effectively the concerns of the foreign
country exception. This Comment urges such an approach.
Kelly McCracken *
* The Author wishes to thank Professor Daniel Selmi for his guidance and suggestions
throughout the preparation of this Comment.
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